Abstract: Focusing on Japanese foreign aid administration, or officially called Official Development Assistance (ODA) 2 , this paper discusses two trends since the 1990s, specifically two kinds of changes, which seem to contradict each other. One trend is "participatory ODA," in which the Japanese government, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), eagerly asks Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) to participate in aid activity. The other is the increasing attempts of MOFA to "steer" Japanese ODA so as to gather more information on the needs of potential recipients and organize coherent aid strategies. This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of these seemingly contradictory trends using the framework of governance, especially that of governance as networks.
Introduction
Recently, the participation of citizens in policy implementation has increased rapidly and changed the way of looking at public policies. For example, in the area of social welfare, local governments pay public funds to qualified NPOs to care for the elderly. The care system started in FY 2000, and as of the end of 2003 more than 14,000 NPOs have qualified and serve seniors (Hattori 2004) . In general, participation is considered to be equal to the empowerment of people, but it is not completely without problems. In the case of nursing elders, some NPOs have been criticized for ignoring standards and unexpectedly exercising too much discretion.
Those who appreciate the market mechanism in problem-solving may overlook this kind of dilemma. Here lies the issue concerning mechanisms to solve the problem of allocating resources. Rhodes (1999, xviii) says that the market mechanism is not the only such mechanism available but that there are at least three kinds of mechanisms, or "governing structures" in his words: markets, hierarchies, and networks.
Characteristics of each are summarized in Table 1 . One can notice that, unlike in markets in which prices enable exchanges and in hierarchies in which authoritative orders and controls are determinative, in networks interdependent actors exchange resources (e.g., information) on the basis of trust. Rhodes (1999, xviii) Among many approaches regarding governance, and currently trendy among academics, "governance as networks" emphasizes the effectiveness of networks. One of the important characteristics of this approach is that it highlights the role of the public sector in steering a country's policies while simultaneously assuming an interdependent relationship between the public and private sectors. Studying the "indirect government" or the "vending machine model of government service," Kettl (2002, 500) claims that "networked relationships puts [sic] greater emphasis on the bridge-building, boundary spanning skills of managers [i.e. public administration]."
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The problems surrounding NPOs that care for the elderly show that one can apply the framework of governance as networks to actual public policies. Scholars tend to consider ODA as an exception to such policies, but this attitude risks discouraging 4 people from studying public policies from a comparative perspective, and finding common characteristics and making general statements. Claiming that governance as networks can explain changes in Japanese ODA since the 1990s, this paper places foreign aid within the field of public policies.
This paper first reviews the existing literature on or potentially relevant for Japanese ODA, which reveals that the dominant perspective has rarely assumed an interdependent relationship between the public and private sectors. Next, this paper examines why scholars have not focused on networks in the past and concludes that one possible reason is the prior existence of a unilateral relationship between the sectors whereby the private section did not have to cede its autonomy to the public one. It then looks at how the situation concerning ODA has changed since the mid-1980s as evidenced by the Japanese government's leadership in the field and its attempts to establish national aid strategies as well as by the increasing participation by the private sector, especially by NGOs. After that, this paper goes on to discuss how the public sector has become more systematic with respect to ODA, focusing on two important examples: the setting up of country and regional study groups and establishment of a system of feedback among MOFA, JICA and IFIC. Finally, by means of an empirical analysis, this paper examines the effect of the institutional changes on the behavior of 5 businesses with respect to ODA and concludes that such changes have had a statistically significant effect on business, thereby supporting the use of "governance as networks"
as a viable approach to study the distribution of Japanese ODA.
Extant Studies and Their Views on Mechanisms

The Dominant Perspective Has Rarely Assumed an Interdependent
Relationship between the Public and Private Sectors
Prior literature assumes either bureaucratic dominance or business' controls over ODA, where cooperation, that is networks, between the political / administrative and business elite is not considered.
For example, Rix (1980) contends that the decision-making process of the Japanese government is characterized by conflicts among ministries, which are assumed to represent the diversified interests in Japanese society. Citing the example of the
Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI) [currently the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)] 4 , considered by him to be one of the most influential ministries, Arase (1995) explains the concentric structure of Japanese aid administration where the ministry is core, agencies surround the core, and private actors are in the periphery (Arase 1995, 197) . These studies consider the elite to be dominant 6 over private actors, and the autonomy of the latter is rather discounted, despite the fact that quite a few of these studies conclude that business interests contribute in some way to Japanese foreign aid. Sumi's (1989) is among the studies that have criticized the manner in which Japanese foreign aid is managed, claiming that Japanese ODA is dominated by business interests including consulting firms and that people in developing countries suffer from Japanese aid projects. Sumi assumes that the private sector controls foreign aid. He advocates the strengthening of public organizations by merging the existing multiple agencies which deal with ODA. It is interesting that he never considers the interdependent relationship between sectors as preferring the public control of the private sector to the private control of the public sector.
In sum, many extant studies tend not to pay full attention to the various possibilities within the framework of governance as networks.
Of course, not all prior literature has ignored the cooperative, or rather interdependent, relationship between the public and private sectors. Kato (1998) , for instance, emphasizes the interdependence between the political / administrative elite and private actors with respect to Japanese foreign aid. He contends that the Japanese government and companies have had close contact and the latter has shared information 7 on developing countries with the former. Readers may notice that he devotes more time in applying his theory to German cases than to Japanese ones. One wishes that he had spent more time applying the framework of governance as networks to Japanese cases.
Why Scholars Have Not Focused on Networks: Existence of a Unilateral
Relationship between the Public and Private Sectors.
A literature review in the field of foreign aid shows that people have rarely focused on the interdependent relationship between the public and private sectors in Japan.
This section discusses the background and reason for this.
Due to the dearth of public policy literature specific to Japanese ODA, reference to general public policy literature focusing on the interdependence between the public and private sectors may be useful. Looking at the framework of governance as networks with respect to public policies in general, one can notice that an interdependent, although not necessarily equal, relationship is assumed among members of networks. Rhodes (1999) believes that exchange of resources results in the smooth working of networks. Though using the words "new governance instruments," Peters (2005, 80) states that since actors need others' cooperation, they trade their assets. He points out 8 that "social actors … must also cede some autonomy in order to gain direct involvement in the policy-making processes" (Peters 2005, 80 ).
Peters' comment concerning public policies in general, however, does not necessarily apply to Japanese firms involved in foreign aid between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1980s, and one may conclude that this could be a reason that many extant studies have not considered networks as a problem-solving mechanism.
To understand the background of Japanese ODA, one must look at both qualitative and quantitative studies on Japanese foreign aid administration.
Examining the relationship between the public and private sectors with respect to Japanese ODA during the aforementioned period, some quantitative studies conclude that Japanese private consulting firms have exercised some influence on Japanese foreign aid, although they focus on different aspects of the ODA process. Looking at the linkage between the number of projects major Japanese consultants recommended to developing countries between FY 1964 and FY 1974 and the number of projects the Japanese government accepted, Rix (1980, 207) finds that more than 10 percent of the projects Japanese consultants had promoted were actually realized as Japanese ODA projects. Focusing on one of the largest and oldest consulting companies in Japan, Nihon Koei Ltd., Mori (1995, 100) shows a positive correlation between the business 9 profits of the consulting company and the amount of yen loans given as a part of ODA between FY 1968 to FY 1990 One can interpret these studies from two different perspectives. Some may insist that these data are evidence that Japanese private companies had some influence on Japanese ODA. Others may interpret that the consulting firms were controlled by the government, which wanted to strengthen links between Japan and developing countries, especially Asian nations. However, some qualitative studies can be used to refute the latter conclusion and enable one to notice that certain social sectors did not have to cede their autonomy because the government could not but rely on them.
One example is the yen loan to India in FY 1958. This was the first time the Japanese government had given ODA in the form of a yen loan. According to a study, Mitsubishi, a private trading firm but not necessarily a consultant, persuaded MITI and other competent ministries, which were reluctant to provide foreign aid to the country, maintaining that India was a very large market to sell Japanese products (Nagano and
Kondo (Eds.). 1999, 205).
Consulting firms possessing more information than the Japanese government had influenced ODA decisions in a more explicit way. Rix (1980) explains that, given that Japanese ODA has been and is distributed in response to a request from a developing 10 country in need, Japanese consultants connected with developing countries, especially
Asian countries, could easily find their favorite projects accepted as projects for Japanese ODA. This is because, during WWII, many Japanese consultants independently conducted surveys in Asian countries and established strong links with their governments. As a result, private consultants had been privy to much more information about Asian countries than the Japanese government, and thus, they had been in a better position to more easily identify the needs of Asian countries.
Consultants with an extensive amount of information had been helpful not only for the governments of developing countries, but also for the Japanese government which had limited resources in terms of finances and staff (Rix 1980, 200) .
For example, Yutaka Kubota, the first president of Nihon Koei Ltd., one of the largest consulting companies in Japan as noted above, independently conducted research on Sumatra, Indonesia during WWII (Sumi 1989, 127-137) . In his Asahan
Project, he proposed the construction of a hydroelectric dam to enable the refining of crude aluminum. Although Japan's eventual defeat forced him to give up the project, he lobbied the Japanese government to include it in the list of its reparations. The
Asahan Project itself was rejected as a reparation project due to the indifference of aluminum refining companies in Japan, but the Japanese government accepted an 11 alternative dam project that had also been proposed by Kubota. 6 Without Nihon Koei
Ltd. or its information, one of the biggest ODA projects 7 in Indonesia might never have been realized.
That having been said, one can claim that in the post-war era until the mid-1980s the nature of the relationship between the public and private sectors was not bilateral but unilateral. Members of the private sector had often possessed more information and expertise about developing countries than the Japanese government had. This is why members of the Japanese private sector did not have to give up their autonomy concerning foreign aid, and why scholars in this field have not taken "governance as networks" into serious consideration. However, the situation has changed since the early 1990s as the Japanese government has been striving to collect more information on the needs of potential recipients and to make its foreign aid strategies much clearer while simultaneously encouraging more citizens to commit themselves to the implementation of ODA
Factors Which Have Promoted Changes in ODA Distribution: The Changing Environment
The increasing reliance on civil society since the early 1990s as well as attempts to 12 gather more information and seek national aid strategies after two scandals in 1986 has led to an emphasis on the various roles of government. Facts show that the framework of governance is applicable to Japanese ODA and that foreign aid faces the same dilemmas as other public policies in Japan.
Attempts to Gather More Information and Seek National Aid Strategies
The year 1986 was a memorable year for Japanese ODA because the "Marcos scandal" as well as a Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) scandal were brought to light. Since and as a result of those scandals, national strategies on ODA have been sought and several institutional changes have occurred.
In March of that year, the U.S. Senate released several documents concerning Ferdinand Marcos, the former president of the Philippines, who had exiled himself in
Hawaii. The documents were thought to be evidence that Marcos had lined his own pockets with national funds. Among them were documents that showed that Japanese firms had continued to contract yen loan projects with the Marcos administration despite unreasonably high charges that had to be paid by the Japanese government along with project costs. The charges were not necessary for the projects themselves and people thought that the Japanese firms had used the surplus as a sort of kickback for Marcos. proposal system based on a contract with JICA" (JICA 1999, 28) . A few JICA staff were arrested for taking bribes from Japanese consulting firms that desired to be selected to undertake Development Surveys.
These two infamous events led Japanese people to criticize their government for lacking coherent ODA strategies for each developing country. This is because coherent strategies, as well as collection of information by the Japanese government accompanied with preparation of the strategies, were thought to be a cure for the corrupt practices of business interests. Faced with the outcry of its constituency, the Japanese government formed country and regional study groups.
14 In addition to establishing these groups, the government promulgated the ODA Charter in 1992. 10 The charter includes four basic principles to be followed when giving Japanese foreign aid. The first is that the development projects should not harm the environment. The second is that the aid should not be used for military goals in the recipient country. The third is that, when deciding to donate, the government should be attentive to questions such as how much of the budget in the developing country is used for defense, and whether the country has weapons of mass destruction. The fourth is that the Japanese government should pay attention to such matters as the degree of freedom in the country, its achieved level of democracy, and its efforts toward introduction of a market economy.
Increasing Private Sector Participation, Especially by Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs)
Soon after the Japanese government began its attempts to make coherent national aid strategies, the Cold War ended and the call for effective use of the budget started to be seen also in the realm of ODA, which, unlike other policy areas, had been The caveat is that studies, such as that of Saotome (2003, 70) , claim that the roles of the NGOs in formulating aid strategies are relatively small compared with those in implementation. Saotome's (2003) comment coincides with this paper's contention that governmental steering is inevitable even if the number of implementing actors increases. However, it is necessary to examine more evidence to support this contention. Here is a key question: is it really the case that the public sector has become more systematic in its steering of Japanese foreign aid? If it is, one may safely 17 say that "governance as networks" is of help in this field. If it is not, the changes in Japanese foreign aid since the 1990s stand for mere outsourcing and Japanese ODA can be more clearly analyzed from the perspective of market-oriented approaches. 
Trend Towards a More
Establishing a System of Feedback among IFIC, MOFA and JICA
In the late 1990s, the Japanese government established an additional system to gather information on developing countries and to make concrete ODA strategies, including JICA country programs and Japan's country assistance strategies. formulates the county program to achieve the goals set in the country assistance strategy. Fourth, a request for the establishment of a new Country Study Group may be made since the Japanese ODA, given to the country based on the previous Country Study Group report, may have changed the country's circumstances, and more up-to-date solutions may be necessary.
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Thailand is a suitable example. The first Country Study Group report was published in 1989, and the second one in 1996. After four years had passed since the publication of the second report, the country assistance strategy for Thailand was completed. Since the Japanese government thought that Japanese ODA, based on the strategy, had improved the Thai economy and society, a new Country Study Group was established. It published the third report in 2003. Two years after that, revision of the country assistance strategy was commenced. Table 3 shows that only a few country assistance strategies have been devised without reliance on previously compiled country study reports. These tables are evidence that the public sector has become more systematic with respect to ODA, which supports the approach of governance as networks. Table 3 Year 
Hypothesis
Here one may raise a results question: Have institutional changes since the early 1990s transformed the policy output, that is, ODA itself? Hook and Zhang (1998) compare correlations between ODA and several social and economic variables from FY 1986 to FY1988 with those from FY1993 to FY1995.
Their conclusion is that the ODA Charter in 1992 did not have a significant influence on Japanese foreign aid administration vis-à-vis trade since the correlations between the characteristics of trade between Japan and the recipient countries and the way ODA was distributed were similar for both periods. However, two problems exist regarding the study. The first is that five years, meaning the time period between FY1988 (the end of the first period) and FY1993 (the start of the second period), might be too short a period to expect to see substantial changes. The second is that, as discussed in the previous sections, institutional changes have continued even after the publication of the Charter.
Therefore, for a more thorough evaluation of their impact on changes in Japanese ODA beginning in the 1990s, one needs also to study more recent data than those considered by Hook and Zhang.
Rix ( (Table 4) .
Results
The results indicate that in Period 2 the foreign aid policies of the previous year have had a larger impact on decisions concerning BUSINESS than ODA policies had in Period The third column of Table 4 regarding standardized coefficients shows that, although both independent variables, (i.e., the BUSINESS and the ODA), are important, the latter has more robust influence (0.3556 < 0.6380). 15 This result is interestingly surprising given that the lagged dependent variables in statistical analyses tend to have a strong influence. 16 At the same time, the result supports the claim that foreign aid distributed by the government leads the business activities of the private sector. The above is a rather primitive analysis, given the limited amount of information.
Nevertheless, results of this linear regression analysis support the claim that, to the extent that the impact of foreign aid exceeds that of business success, i.e., BUSINESS, the governmental attitudes toward foreign aid have influenced private firms. One can interpret that ODA policies somehow determine or re-direct business decisions, unlike in the past when private actors seemed to make stronger attempts and led the Japanese government.
Conclusion
Presenting data from IFIC as well as JICA and MOFA, this paper shows that since 28 the early 1990s the government has attempted to steer foreign aid more strongly than before despite the government's apparent preference for outsourcing and the increase in the number of actors who are engaged in Japanese ODA. Behind it is the historical fact that the relationship between the public and private sectors has changed from a unilateral one to a bilateral one. It is interesting that two major public organizations for implementation of ODA, that is JICA and JBIC (the Japan Bank for International Cooperation) which provides yen loans, are being merged into one large agency. This means that the public sector's systematization is still going on.
Although ODA is one of the "deviant examples" (Peters 1988, 146 ) among public policies, this paper reveals that the implications of the approach of governance as networks can be applied even to the policy area of Japanese ODA. This is because the Japanese government faces the same dilemma in foreign aid as in other fields such as welfare programs. Using such an approach enables people to better understand the common and comparable aspects of public policies in general.
This paper stresses that steering by the government with respect to foreign aid has become more prevalent and even necessary in recent times. However, it is important to recognize the contributions of business interests, NGOs and others as well as dedicated government officials to ODA.
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In conclusion, it is hoped that this paper has provided a basic academic framework to understand what has been and is happening in the area of ODA, and that it will promote communication between the public and private sectors.
Appendix Appendix 1: Relevant ministries, agencies and sub-agencies
Ministries Agencies Sub-agencies Assistance (ODA), in this paper the term "foreign aid" is used interchangeably with 31 "ODA."
MOFA --------------------JICA -------------IFIC |------------others MOF-----------------------JBIC MITI (METI) ------------JETRO
3 The approach of "indirect government" seems more similar to New Public Management (NPM), often characterized as market-oriented, than to the framework of "governance."
However, as Akizuki (2006, 190) states, the latter covers a wider range since it deals with questions about who to govern, with whom to govern, and whether governments must govern as well as the question about how to govern, in which NPM is exclusively interested. In addition, Sotokawa (2005) explains that the approach of governance partially overlaps with that of NPM. This is the reason this paper cites Kettl (2002) .
